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Supervisory and monitoring costs are explored to understand aspects
of occupational segregation by sex. Around the turn of this century
47 percent of all female manufacturing operatives were paid by the
piece, but only 13 percent of the males were. There were very few
males and females employed by the same firm in the same occupation,
and when they were, they were invariably paid by the piece. The
group of industries that hired two—thirds of all male operatives,
hired virtually no females. Males, but not females, were employed in
teams across a variety of industries, and there was segregation by
sex across various jobs requiring similar training and ability.
Occupations in the clerical sector were rapidly "feminized" from 1900
to 1920 and an organization of work was employed resembling that used
earl ler In manufacturing. These findings can be understood by
considering a model of occupational segregation In which monitoring
is costly and males and females have different turnover rates.
Employers adopt one of two solutions to avoid shirking ——piecerates
and deferred payment. Because females are only employed In one
period, piece rates are used for them; males, however, might prefer
deferred payment which causes their earnings profile to be steeper
than otherwise. Occupational segregation by sex results even if
workers are homogeneous with regard to ability and there are no
costs of job Investment. Males can also receive higher average
wages per period than females. Under a reasonable set of
assumptions, females would want to be employed in the male sector,
but would be barred from doing so.
Establ ishment—level and more aggregated data for manufacturing
around 1890 are examined with regard to the costs of supervising and
monitoring male and female workers In time and piece—rate positions.
The findings tend to support the assumptions of the model concerning








An index of sex segregation across about 300 occupations in the United
States has remained roughly constant from the beginning of thiscentury at a
value of 66, implying that two—thirds of either the male or the female labor
force would have to change occupations to achieve occupationalequal ity (Gross.
1968; Blau and Hendricks 1979; BelIer and Han 1982 note a decline in the index
during the 1970s). The origins and persistence of occupational segregation by
sex have been explained within two general frameworks, one comprising a set of
market forces and another a set of norms and ideologiescircumscribing female
roles. Neither paradigm, however, has yielded a universal lyaccepted framework.
It is the contention of this paper that both fail to explain certainaspects of
male and female Jobs, such as various differences inmanufacturing occupations
for males and females around the turn of this century and the swiftemergence
of females in the clerical sector somewhat later. Aspects ofsupervisory and
monitoring costs are explored to understand long—term trends in occupational
segregation.
According to the human capital model (Mincer and Polachek 1974; Polachek
1979, 1981; Zalokar 1982; although see England 1982), individuals chooseoccupations
consistent with their life—cycle labor force participation. Because of their
more abbreviated and discontinuous labor force activity women opt for occupations
with lower investment costs and less depreciation with timeaway from the job
than do men. This framework can explain a substantial portion of observed
differences in occupations by sex across broadly defined categories, sucha
professionals and personal service workers. But it does less well in explaining
occupational choice within groupings.
In terms of long—term trends, the fol lowing questions seem to remain
only partly answered by the human capital model. Why was there segregation2
by sex across certain jobs within manufacturing which required similar training
and ability? Why were 47 percent of all female operatives in manufacturing
paid by the piece (or some variant of incentive pay), while only 13 percent
of all male operatives were in 1890? Why were males and females invariably
paid by the piece and rarely by time when both worked at the same job in the
same firm? Why were males, but rarely females, employed in teams within
manufacturing? And of related interest, why do females frequently complain
that they are exluded from certain occupations when there are no obvious entry
barriers? Finally, if, as will be demonstrated below, the returns to specific
human capital in clerical work were approximately equal for females and males,
what accounted for the swift feminization of the clerical sector in the first three
decades of this century?
The model that will be employed to explain these questions is a variant
of a shirking model of the Salop and Salop (1976) and Lazear (1979, 1981)
variety, although an incentive pay model of the Lazear and Rosen (1981) type is
complementary to the analysis. Workers differ only by the amount of time they
intend to stay on the job; males remain for two or more periods, but females
only for one.In all other respects, with the possible exception of reservation
wages, these workers are identical. The high cost of supervising the output of
workers leads employers to adopt one of two solutions to avoid shirking ——
piecerates and deferred payment. Because females are not employed in period
2, only piece rates can be used for them; males, however, could prefer deferred
payment which causes their earnings profile to be steeper than otherwise.
Occupational segregation by sex results even if workers are homogeneous
with regard to their ability and there are no costs of job investment. Because
the monitoring of piece rates may be costlier to use in comparison with deferred
payment, but may be cheaper than ordinary time rates, males can receive higher3
wagesin equilibrium than females.1 Life—cycle labor force participation
differences between males and females dictate the final result, but individual
choice of occupations does not.2 Under a reasonable set of assumptions, females
would want to be employed in the male sector but would be barred from doing
so. The exclusion of females from this sector would be efficient.
Establishment—level, as well as more highly aggregated data, for manufacturing
around the turn of 1-his century are examined with regard to the costs of supervising
and monitoring male and female workers in time and piece—rate positions.
Evidence on piece—rate workers across industries are presented to explore the
predictions of the model.
Even though the entire occupational distribution has been widely segregated
by sex, certain occupations have "changed sex" over time, and their study
can reveal factors fostering segregation. Occupations in the clerical sector
underwent -I-his transformation in the early part of this century. The clerical
sector was "routinized," as had occurred earlier in manufacturing enabling
employers to hire females. Qual itative and empirical evidence are presented
indicating thai- the cost of supervising workers was reduced, but not the firm—level
specificity of human capital, as has been claimed. General training, acquired
off the job, substituted for on—the—job training and enabled employers to
1 Addedproduction costs might result from using piece rates. The production
process would have to be altered to divide the good into component parts that
could be easily counted and checked for quality. The model below will assume
that these costs (or benefits in the case of economies from division of labor)
are zero.
2Turnover, and not life—cycle labor force participation, is the actual
variable of importance. Women could have discontinuous and abbreviated I ife—cycle
labor force participation but have lower turnover than men; that is their
length of time with firms could be longer. Most empirical evidence indicates,
however, i-hal- women have considerably higher turnover and lower lengths of stay
with firms. Higher turnover was evident in the 1920s (see, for example, Rogers
1929), and lower lengths of stay with firms are observed in 1980s data from
the Current Population Surveys.4
homogenize their labor forces based on various pre—employment tests. Secretarial
services were thus supervised without the use of more costly piece rates.
2. A Monitoring Model of Occupational Segregation
Assume that good Q is the only good produced in the manufacturing sector
and that It can be produced by one of two processes. (I) 9 can be divided
into (n—i) parts and put together in an nth operation. Each of the parts
is made separately, and a piece—rate system of payment can be used to pay
labor when output quantity is easily monitored and output quality is not an
important variable. (II) Alternatively, 9 can be made in one process, possibly
using a time—rate system of payment particularly when input quantity canbe
easily monitored and output quality cannot be ascertained cheaply. Thus there
will be (n+1) occupations if both processes coexist. Examples of goods which
have been made by both types of processes simultaneously are coats and cigars,
but it Is generally the case that when both processes coexist the goods vary
by quality with the higher quality good made on time. It will beassumed
at present but considered in more detail later, that the nature ofthe good is
independent of the production process.
Also assume that there are two types of labor Lf (female) and Lm (male),
homogeneous and identical except that Lf is in the labor force for only 1
period and Lm is in for more than 1 period. They can also differ in their
labor supply functions to this Industry.It is critical, however, that both
types of labor will shirk if their inputs and/or outputs go unsupervised.
Three combinations of payment and supervision can be used: (1) time—rate
with supervision of input; (2) piece—rate with supervision of output; and
(3) time—rate with an incentive pay structure having a rising pay scale with
time on the job (Salop and Salop 1976; Lazear 1979, 1981; Guasch and Weiss5
1981). Method (3) Involves the supervision ofinput and a monitoring of
output.It will be assumed now, and explored empirically later, that the
monitoring costs of method (3) are less costly than those in (2), and that
the monitoring costs of method (1) are the most expensive. In the model below
it is impi icity assumed that there are neither costs nor benefits todividing
the good into component parts; that is, it is costless to invent piece rates
and there are no gains from such further division of labor.
The first production process (I) for good 9 can be represented by:
fi(L1, R1, S) I =1, ..., fl—i
where L =labor,R =rawmaterials, and S =supervision.Assume, as well,
that this production process is constant returns to scale in L, R, and S,
fixed proportions, and identical across all i. Eachq1 is part of 9 such
that the joining of the component parts of 9 is defined as the nthprocess,
nQ =q.
Each laborer on piece rates gets paid the following for each unit of
output, under zero profit conditions
=p—s—r,
where s =perunit costs of supervision, and r =perunit costs of raw materials.
3 The models in each ofthese articles differ from that presented below because
each assumes that workers are heterogeneous in some factor relating to work
effort or quitting and that the firm cannot determine this differenceprior to
hiring. The workers in the model below are homogeneous in their productivity
and all will shirk if not monitored or given some incentive. Butthey differ
in their turnover, which can be easily determined by the firm.Salop and Salop
(1976) assume that workers differ by turnover and that firms cannotdistinguish
between slow and fast quitters before hiring. Their incentivecompatible
scheme is to withhold a fraction of earnings from workers in one period which
are returned in the next. Guasch and Weiss (1981) assume that workers differ
in ability and that, for risk—neutral workers, there always existsa self—selection
mechanism in which workers pay for a test which, if passed, gives workers a
known return. Lazear (1979) considers the impact of these types ofimpI icit
contracts on the date of voluntary retirement and generates a model of optimal
mandatory retirement. Note that there is a close relationship between the
results of these models and those of internal labor markets, although the
motivation for each of the constructs might differ.6
The price of each piece, p, Is the price of Q, P, divided by n, p =P/n.
It wIll be assumed that the price of Q, F, Is fixed exogenously.
Assume that the supply of labor function for Lf, defined in terms of
the number of pieces produced at each piece rate, is:
q =h(w)
h' >0,
and gives the number of pieces produced per period. As shown in Figure 1,
when P =Pand the equilibrium piece rate is production will be q* per
worker or kq* for all piece workers, if each has an identical piece supply
function. That IS,(q*in)k=kQ*unIts of the good wIll be produced. There
will be n occupations and (k/n) persons per occupation. Each worker receives
an income of y =q*w*per period worked.
Alternatively, or in conjunction with process (I), the industry can use
process (II),
Q =g(L,R, S),
also assumed to be constant returns to scale and fixed proportions. In order
to compare this production process with that given by (I), we must know the
output per period produced by time workers. One assumptIon is that k time
workers, given an amount of monitoring derived below, produce on average exactly
what k piece workers do at a wage equivalent to a piece rate of wp*. In this
case each time worker would have an accepted output standard of Q*n =q*units
per time period.
The zero profit condition implies that each time worker will receive:
=(P—nr—s')(q/n)—
wheres is the per unit output supervision cost and -I- is the per time period
input supervision cost. The first term in parentheses is the per unit (short—run)
profit and the second is the amount of final output produced. The last term, t,7
is the cost per -1-Imeperiodof supervising a time worker.4 The standardization
of the two methods implies that at the existing price of the output, P, there
Is an s' and a t such that q* per worker is elicited per period. At that 5
andt, firms would be indifferent between hiring time and piece—rate workers.
In general, therefore,
=+ (sq—[s'q/nl—t),
and the difference in the earnings of time and piece workers, denoted as m,
depends on the degree to which supervisory costs differ between the two methods.
WhHe i-f- seems reasonable that sq >s'q/n,or that the monitoring of output is
cheaper for time workers because there are fewer pieces, it is not clear that the
magnitude of t wili not swamp this difference. Furthermore, it is not clear
whether the costs of monitoring a unit of the piece—rate good are less than the
costs of monitoring a unit of the time—rate good, that is the relationship
between s and s'.
Consider only the first two types of payment and supervision. The costs of
monitoring for type (1), time rate with only input supervision, could be
sufficiently high that all workers would opt for piece—rate work. That is, s
per unit and t per person as supervision costs to elicit q*, might be high
enough so that ''t <Y,
and then all workers would prefer to work on piece. An
alternative to piece rates, however, is to hire only the Lm workers, all of
whom will be in the iabor force for at least two periods, and pay them:
=
(wp*q*
+m—e)< ÷m for period 1, and
't2 =(wp*q*
+m+e)> ÷m for period 2,
where m =q*(s—[s'/nJ)—t= — e=anoptimal deferred payment, and
Note that while one could use the time workers to produce using the
piece—rate technology, it would general ly be more expensive to do so because of
the added number of pieces to monitor. That is, if S'= s,supervision costs
would be higher employing time workers on the piece—rate technology.8
there are zero rates of interest and time preference.
The incentive scheme of facing workers with an upward sloping wage profile
works because employers can easily screen individuals who will not remain
in the labor force for two periods, and there is sufficient monitoring of
output that shirking can be detected prior to period 2.If time workers do not
produce the required output level, they are dismissed after the firsttime
period and can only be hired in the piece—rate sector in the second period.
Because workers value only income, they would rather work in the time rate
sector for both periods when m >0.The firm promises the workers to pay
in the second period, giving the workers an incentive to produce the required
level of output in the first period.
The time—rate experience profile rises with time on the job even though
productivity does not. When m >e,the Lfs would want to enter the first
period time—rate job, but are prevented from doing so because thethreat of
firing them would be of no consequence. The size of e can be determinedin a
more comprehensive model by two sets of factors, the stability and reputation
of the firms and the cost of effort to the workers. (See Lazear 1979, 1981 for
the determinants of the optimal profile.)Note that when m >0.theJ.
receive higher lifetime average income than do the Lfs, when all n+1 occupations
exist. This result holds even though all labor is intrinsically of equal
productivity and even if when m <e,or the deferred payment is greater than
the difference in supervision costs.
A final issue concerns the conditions under which both types of workers,
and thus both processes (comprising the n+1 occupations), will coexist, and
if so, which workers use which processes. The answer depends on the supply
of labor.In the piece work case, i-i- was assumed that all labor was identical






functions, all identical. For time work, however, the simplest case would
be one in which the opportunity cost for each worker differs, and thus the
supply function gives the number of laborers supplied per time period at each
Y.' Because only the LmS will never be chosen to work on the time—rate jobs
if m >0,time—rate workers will be called Lms.In the case drawn in Figure
1, the supply function S'Lm happens to lead to an equal number of Lm and Lf
workers; StL leads to more Lm workers; and S*Lm results in no Lm workers.
Thus the ratio (Lf/Lm) depends upon the position of the male labor supply
function and the level of m, given the piece—rate supply function.
When both processes are used and m >0,the following results will obtain:
(1) Complete occupational segregation by sex;
(2) Females will all be paid by the piece and males by time;
(3) The ratio of female to males earnings will be [YI(Y +m)J<1,
on average, although for first period employees It could be >1if m <e;and
(4) If m <e,females would want to enter the entry—level Lm occupation
but will be prevented from doing so.
3. MonItoring and Supervision In Manufacturing, circa 1890
Only one type of good existed in the monitoring model, and the method
of payment for labor was solely determined by the costs of monitoring and
differences in life—cycle employment across workers.In the real world, however,
there are other reasons for using different methods of payment that determiNe
the types of goods made by piece and time and the types of workers that will
be employed in each process.
Three additional cases must be added. Certain types of goods might be
divided into pieces more easily than others, and in these the division of
labor itself might reduce per unit costs.In these cases the piece—rate technology
might dominate even in the absence of monitoring costs. Alternatively or in10
conjunction, goods may differ by quality. It is generally presumed that one
can monitor output qual i-t-y more cheaply in low quality goods than in high
qual ity goods (Pencavel 1977). In the latter, one may want to screen workers
and hire only those who will produce goods of uniformly high quality output and
i-hen supervise only by input. Such was the case in 1-he manufacture of clothing
at the turn of this century; high qual ity coats, for example, were made by
skilled tailors working on time, while lower quality coats were made by less
skilled operatives working by the piece; (see the study of men's ready—made
clothing, Volume 87, U.S. Senate 1910/11).
The last reason for the method of payment concerns the variance in skill
level across the various pieces or stages in the production process. When
i-he variation in the necessary skill is high, one may want to use the lower
skilled operations to screen workers for i-he higher skilled operations. The
method of screening might be more complex than merely monitoring the output
of workers, 1-he only observable aspect of piece—rate work. It may, instead,
entail judging the inventiveness of workers, their ability to give orders
and respond In a variety of situations. Ranking individuals in an ordinal
sense may be far cheaper than grading them absolutely. It has been shown
that when workers are risk—neutral a rank—order system of prizes can elicit
the same effort as a piece—rate system (Lazear and Rosen 1981). Both this
variant of the model and that elaborated on above Imply that males will have
a higher variance in earnings than will females, holding productivity constant,
and thus it would be true even if males and females were equally productive
in a deterministic or expected value sense.
The relative use of piece work across Industries and among firms within
an industry can be determined by factors that complement those in the simple
supervisory cost model. The question is whether the division of workers between11
the two types of payment is determined primarily by differences in supervising
workers that arise from differences in life—cycle labor force participation.
Within the context of the formal model above, one might observe females producing
goods that are cheaper to divide Into pieces while males produce other goods
by time. Similarly, males might produce the higher quality good, and males
might also be employed on time—rate pay In industries that screen workers
at one level of production for jobs at another.5 How male and female workers
are sorted across industries might be related to the costs of supervision
given these complementary factors. What are the facts concerning the employment
of males and females in industries around the turn of this century?
The data in Table 1 demonstrate -I-hat 51 percent of all adult male employees
in manufacturing In 1890 were in industries In which adult males were over
94 percent of the labor force. (Adult males were 79 percent of the total
manufacturing labor force.) Because virtually all of the remaining 6 percent
who were not adult males were boys, 51 percent of all adult male employees in
manufacturing could not possibly have been in an occupational—industrial
classification In which there were women.
At the same time, 74 percent of all female employees were in the industries
classified In Table 1 as female Intensive, those in which adult women were
over 30 percent of all employees. (Adult women were 18 percent of the total
manufacturing labor force and children were 3 percent.) It is primarily in
the mixed industries, such as tobacco and printing, and some of the female—intensive
Industries, such as cotton textiles, 1-hat one finds substantial overlap in male
01-her factors 1-hal-mightinfluence the cost effectiveness of using
piece—rates, as opposed to time—rates, have been suggested in Pencavel (1977),
Lazear (1981), and Roummaset and Uy (1980). Piece—rate payment might also
dominate when technical change is not very rapid, when there is a large luck
component in production or sales, and when there Is low variability in the
efficiency of complementary Inputs.Table 1
Sex Segregation and Piece Work Among 46 Large Industries, 1890
"Male—Intensive" Industriesa
%TotalMfg.%AdultMales %AdultWorkers
Labor Force In Labor Forceb on Piece Ratesc
Agricultural Implements 0.93 98 20.59
Blacksmithing & Wheelwr'tlng 1.08 100 2.65
Boots & Shoes, custom work 0.75 98 36.34
Brick, Tile, Clay, & Pottery 2.75 94 3.80
Carpentering 2.97 100 1.62
Carriages, Wagons, and Cars 3.07 99 10.81
Cooperage 0.52 98 41.26
Flouring & Grist MIII 1.35 99 2.13
Foundry & Machine Shop 5.26 99 10.01
Furniture, factory 1.36 95 12.79
iron and Steel 3.24 99 0
Leather, includes morocco 0.90 98 10.89
Liquors, malt 0.74 98 1.27
Lumber & Other Mill Products 6.07 98 3.47
Masonry, Brick, & Stone 2.30 100 1.76
Painting & Paper Hanging 1.19 100 4.94
Plumbing & Gas Fitting 0.90 98 0.74
Saddlery and Harness 0.64 95 21.59
Shipbuilding 0.55 100 4.58
Slaughtering & Meat Packing 0.86 96 3.53
Timber Products 0.98 99 21.51
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"Female— Intensive" I ndustriesa
%TotalMfg.%AdultFemales on Piece Ratesc
Labor Force in Labor Force Females Males
Boots & Shoes, factory 3.00 29 60.0 53.5
Boxes 0.40 65 58.0 23.0
Carpets 0.60 45 (17.8) (14.9)
Clothing, men's 3.32 49 68.1 49.3
Clothing, women's 0.09 63 46.8 43.2
Confectionery 0.06 39 16.7 5.8
Corsets 0.02 81 (63.5) (53.4)
Cotton Goods 4.70 51 73.4 31.7
Dressmaking 1.43 97 * *
Fruits& Vegs., canning 1.08 48 49.7 19.8
Furnishing Goods, men's 0.05 74 65.7 51.7
Gloves & Mittens 0.02 59 (78.0) (39.7)
Hats & Caps 0.06 34 (70.2) (55.3)Hosiery & Knit Goods 1.30 67 63.0 21.3
Millinery & Lace Goods 0.03 73 (41.4) (29.7)
Mi Ilery, custom 0.05 93 * *
Shirts 0.07 79 69.4 52.6
Silk 1.08 57 75.6 39.8
Woolen Goods 1.68 38 76.6 26.3
Worsted Goods 0.09 46 * *
"Mixed"Industries
Clothing, men's custom 1.83 23 (54.0) (56.1)
Paper 0.63 23 (31.4) ( 0.5)
Printing, book & job 1.23 17 (15.0) ( 9.3)
Tobacco 2.75 27 (64.1) (65.5)
Total %ManufacturingLabor Force, in These 24 Industries ...25.5
%AdultFemales Across All Industries 18
Total Adult Female Workers In These 24 industries 1.2
%AdultFemale Workers on Piece Rates Across All Industries •
* Indicatesthat the figure for the percentage on piece rates is vastly understated.
a Male—intensive, female—intensive, and mixed refer to the actual percentage of
males or females in each industry and not to an inherent characteristic of the
industries.
b Male and female children comprise a separate category, not included here, and
the figures for percent adult males and females do not exhaust the entire labor
force.
c The percent of workers on piece rates includes only operatives and nets out
clerical workers and other nonoperatives.
dAdjusted for the undercount of pieceworkers in various industries in the 1890
Census of Manufacturing.
Notes:
Male piecework percentages for female—intensive industries exclude clerical
and supervisory personnel. The data for cotton goods, silk, and woolens are
adjusted for the undercount of pieceworkers in these industries using Department
of Labor (1897). Tobacco includes cigars and cigarettes; leather includes
morocco; boots and shoes, factory includes rubber. Adult females are >15
years old and adult males are >16years old.
Source: United States Census Office (1895).12
and female occupations within late—nineteen-I-h century industries.In what ways
did these industries differ from others?
In looking at the industries in Table 1 that were exclusively male domains,
several factors seem apparent in limiting the presence of females. Many of
these industries required substantial apprenticeships (cooperage, masonry,
plumbing, shipbuilding, custom boot and shoemaking). Still others were physically
demanding (slaughtering, iron and steel, milling). Yet these considerations
alone might not explain the almost complete exclusion of females from the
list. The method of work organization may also have contributed to the exclusivity
of these industries.I-i- should also be pointed out that male earnings were
not higher in the male—intensive industries, even adjusting for the more rural
location of the male—intensive industries.
It was the method of payment and not the absolute level of wages that
differed for males across the three groups of industries. All laborers in
the female—intensive industries were more frequently paid by the piece. Females
were overwhelmingly paid by the piece in comparison with male manufacturing
laborers in both the female—intensive and mixed industries.
Firms were surveyed by the 1890 Census of Manufacturing (U.S. Census
Office 1895) concerning the number of full—time equivalent workers by sex, age
group (adult and child), as well as type of position (clerical, ski I led operative,
unskilled operative, piece rate worker). It is not until 1960 that we again
have comparable data for the entire manufacturing sector. The data in the 1890
Census of Manufacturing indicate that 37 percent of all adult female manufacturing
workers (> 15 years) were paid by the piece but that only 13 percent of all
adult males (>16 years) were.
But the procedure used in the 1890 census to categorize piece—rate workers
severely understates their number. Because so many occupations in the cotton13
goods, silk, and woolens Industries, among others, were piece—rate Jobs, the
census did not record -them as such, but instead grouped these employees inthe
operative category. Only 10.1 percent of female employees were listed as being
employed on piece—rates in cot-I-on goods. The true figure Is considerably
higher.6
Corrected incentive pay figures across all Industries indicate that 47
percent of all female operatives were paid by the piece while only 13 percent
of males were. Females were therefore 3.5 tImes as likely to be employed
on piece rates than were males. Furthermore piece—rate payment almost always
prevai led when males and females occupied the same position in the same firm.
Examples from the textile industry are Instructive.In only one out of the
six predominantly male occupations in cotton textiles was payment generally
made by the piece, but among four in which both men and women were found only
one was paid by time.
Female workers predominated in those industries in which piece—rate work
was common for all workers. The piece—rate percentages In Table 1 are generally
low for all of the male—intensive industries, but the piece—rate percentages
are relatively high for males in the female—intensive industries. Females
were also employed on piece—rate work with greater frequency than were males
within the same industry, and they were Invariably employed on piece—rates
when males also occupied the same job title.
Certain institutional mechanisms, such as teams and inside contracting,
6Stanley Lebergott's chapter in Davis, Easterlin, et al. (1972) also cites
the 1890 Census of Manufacturing figures on piecework without corrections.
Pencavel (1979), in turn, uses the Lebergott figures, although with reservations.
On the undercount in the census, see U.S. Census Office, ManufacturinQ lndustrle-a,
Part I, (1895, p. 173) which states that "an arbitrary rule was adopted that
all pieceworkers whose earnings are limited by the speed of machinery were
to be included with those paid a specific amount by the week, the day, or
the hour."14
also distinguish male—intensive industries from female—intensive ones.It
appears thai- the length of stay In the labor force and on the job may have
been critical in limiting the employment of women in those industries in which
such institutions reduced supervisory costs. Teams were groups of workers
organized by a contractor who dealt directly with the firm's management or
owners and who was contracted to produce a certain amount of output or paid
by the final piece. The agent in turn hired workers, who were frequently
well known to the contractor and to the other members of the team. The type
of work performed fell somewhere in between an intricate division of labor
and a single production process for the good. Teams conserved on supervision
costs for management because the contractors had knowledge of the productivity
of individual workers and were able to increase effort through personal friendships
and kin ties. Teams were general ly found only in the male—intensive industries
or among male workers in other industries. (See Buttrick (1952) who notes
that contractors were frequently paid by the piece; Montgomery (1979) who
discusses teams among molders, tailors, and miners; and Volume 87 of U.S. Senate,
1910/11, on male teams within men's ready—made clothing.)
In certain Industries, in which virtually no women were employed, various
aspects of the process could have been done by unskilled workers, and indeed
were done by women during periods of labor shortage, such as World War I.In
railroad foundries, for example, women were employed during the war in the
production of cores and as machinists. The railroad union protested such
employment after the war claiming that such tasks were an integral part of the
apprenticeship program, and that while women could be effectively employed in
these areas, they undermined the training and screening of skilled workers
(Greenwald 1981, pp. 116—17).
The division of workers into piece and time—rate work, in the formal15
model of Section 2, was a function of the costs of supervision and monitoring.
Do supervision costs differ in the manner predicted by the observed differences
in the form of payment by sex? That is, are supervision costs lower for piece—rate
than time—rate workers In female—intensive industries but higher in male—intensive
industries where other methods of monitoring and supervising were available?
Two sets of data having information on the form of payment and the costs
of supervision are used to explore this issue. One set, from the 1895/96
Report of the Commissioner of Labor (U.S. Department of Labor 1897), contains
firm—level data on female—intensive industries.7 Another, from the 1890 Census
of Manufactures (U.S. Census Office 1897, Part II), contains city—level observations
across all Industries, The first set of data has been used for the female—intensive
industries and the second for the male—intensive ones, of which only foundries
had a large enough number of observations to be usable.
Six industries ——boxes,cigars, clothing, cotton, food, and shoes ——
havebeen selected from the 1895/96 Report for the female—intensive industries.
These industries differed considerably in the degree to which female workers
advanced in jobs over the course of their employment and in the variance in
female wages across occupations. Clothing and cotton textiles had the highest
variance in wages and, it appears from the qual itative evidence, the greatest
degree of occupational shift. Because of these differences, industry
form—of—payment dummies have been added 1-o the female—intensive industry regression
equation explaining supervisory inputs.
The equation in Table 2 explaining supervisory inputs across firms in
The 1895/96 Report includes information on approximately 68,000 male and
80,000 female employees, and of the 364 industries listed in the 1890 Census of
Manufacturing, 57 percent were included in the report. The industries represented
in the survey included, on a national scale, 40 percent of all male operatives
but 96 percent of all female operatives, not a surprising finding given that the
directive was "to investigate ... theconditions attending the employment
of women and children" (p. 11).16
female—intensive industries indicates that supervisory costs were lowest for
male and female piece—rate workers among the industries excluding clothing
and cotton textiles. Male time workers and female time workers were next
in order of lowest supervisory cost. A female time worker, on the margin,
required almost eight times the supervisory input as did a female piece—rate
worker. A male time worker required just one—third the supervisory input
of a female time worker, but almost three times that of a male or female piece—rate
worker.
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Female—intensiveindustries used piece—rate workers to conserve on supervisory
costs. The absolute costs of supervision were nontrivial. The average weekly
wage of a male supervisor was about $25.00. The marginal female time—rate
worker required 0.0440 *($25.00)=$1.10worth of supervision per week or
somewhere between 15 to 20 percent of her weekly earnings. The marginal female
piece—rate worker required 0.00578 *($25.00)=$0.145or only 2 to 3 percent
of her weekly earnings.
Consider now the two special female—intensive Industries, cotton textiles
and clothing. The coefficients on these two industries differ from those
of the other four industries in two important ways: Female time workers were
relatively inexpensive to supervise but male time workers were considerably
more expensive to supervise. Cotton textiles and factory—made clothing,
like the male—intensive industries, utilized screening on the job. Here,
however, screening appears to have taken place within the piece—rate positions.
These industries, however, did not offer much job advancement for their male
workers, and the supervisory input, therefore, was high for male time—rate jobs.8
8 The male workers in these industriesmay very well have been less able
or had high turnover and may have been sorted out of the male—intensive industries
and those in the female—intensive sector which allowed advancement in wages andTable 2
Supervisory Costs and the Form of Payment,
Manufacturing circa 1890
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Cotton Male piece —0.0019 (1.75)
Cotton Male time 0.0425 (1.08)
Cotton Female piece 0.0047 (0.69)
Cotton Female time —0.0508 (2.81)
Clothing Male piece 0.0021 (0.28)
Clothing Male time 0.0441 (3.91)
Clothing Female piece 0.0028 (0.54)
Clothing Female time —0.0537 (3.38)
R2 0.936 0.203
Number of Observations 289 152
Sources and Notes: Male—Intensive Industry, from U.S. Census Office (1895),
Part II: City Totals. The observations are city—Industry cells and have been
weighted by n, where n=the number of firms in the city. Female—Intensive
Industries are from U.S. Department of Labor (1897), where the observation
is a firm. t—statistics are in parentheses.17
The results from the male—intensive Industry are different from those
for most of the female—Intensive industries. Supervisory costs were greatest,
a-I- the margin, for the piece—rate workers and were only slightly higher for
the unskilled than for the skilled workers.In the male—intensive industry
an additional male piece—rate worker added about the same number of supervisors
as did a male time—rate worker in the four female—intensive Industries. A
male time—rate worker In the male—intensive Industries added about the same
number of supervisors as did a female or male piece—rate worker In the four
female—Intensive industries. This reversal of the costs of supervision suggests
that the formal model may have captured some of the intrinsic differences
between the nature of production and work supervision in the two sets of
industries. Male time workers in-I-he male—Intensive industries may have been
supervised less expensively than were time workers In other industries because
they were offered an incentive compatible contract or worked in teams or were given
prizes at certain intervals.
It might also be asked whether the supervisors were male or female and
whether the costs of obtaining able supervisors varied across industries. The
first question can be easily addressed, but the second will have to await the
collection of additional data on the earnings of both the supervisors and the
workers. Both female and male supervisors were used in the female—intensive
industries, but, as might be expected, the female supervisors were used almost
exclusively to supervise female workers, although they were also used for male
piece—rate workers. Female supervisors, however, did not oversee the male time—rate
workers, a position, it appears, that was reserved for 1-he male supervisors.
The impl icat Ions of the formal model also concerned the shape of the
position.I-I- should be noted that the firms in the 1895/96 Report were generally
larger firms and therefore did not include the outside contracting shops in
men's clothing which hired skilled tailors organized into teams.18
female and male earnings functions. The male earnings function would be expected
to rise over the two periods while that for females is defined only over one
period.In actuality, females stay in the labor force for a number of periods,
some perhaps for as long as 1-he average male. These females may be grouped
with other females in terms of occupations and therefore have flatter earnings
profiles than otherwise. Because piece work involves a degree of on—the—job
learning, but not necessarily what is usually termed investment, the profile
might be expected to rise initially and not be as flat as assumed in the model.
Empirical work substantiates the claim that male earnings rose more
continuously with time on the job but that female earnings functions rose
more steeply during the early period of employment. In a study of native—born
male manufacturing workers in Michigan around 1890 (Hannon 1977), earnings
rose for almost 30 years with time on the job. Studies of female earnings
around 1-hat period (Goidin 1980; Eichengreen 1984) indicate that earnings
rose more steeply for females than for males but peaked considerably earlier.
While these findings are consistent with the monitoring model, they are also
consistent with a human capital model of occupational segregation. Males
may accumulate human capital over a longer period of time than do females,
with their wages following their rising productivity. Females, on the other
hand, could learn considerably In their early working lives, but decide not
to invest in human capital having a longer gestation period. The true test
between the two hypotheses, that of human capital and that of monitoring,
is whether male productivity advances with their earnings. This test cannot
be accomplished for the historical period being studied, but there is evidence
for the current period that wages do not necessarily follow marginal products
(Medoff and Abraham 1981; Lazear and Rosen 1981).19
3. The "Feminization" of the Clerical Sector
The clerical sec-f-or was rapidly feminized and ranks today as one of the
major employers of women.In 1870 fewer than 3 percent of all clerical employees
were women, but as early as 1900 30 percent were, and by 1930 over 50 percent
were women. It has been frequently claimed that this "feminization" was the
result of technological changes, such as the mechanization of the office.
A direct extension of this view Is that the firm—specific component of clerical
skills declined, particularly with the adoption of the typewriter (Rotella
1981). Nineteen-I-h century clerks were managers in training, but twentieth
century office typists had very limited occupational advancement.It seems
clear that the new techniques and machinery changed the nature of the job
and opened the way for the employment of females.
But was the "feminization" of the office a function of the reduced level
of skill required with the division of office work into tasks or was It a
function of a reduced level of supervision needed to elicit some level of
output? Here again, the human capital model and the monitoring model have
similar implications and could provide complementary explanations. But several
impi ications of each are distinct. One is to be found in the history of typing
and the attempts by managers to avoid expensive piece rate payments. The
second concerns the returns to specific human capital. If the human capital
model of office "feminization" is correct, one should find that females accumulated
less firm—specific human capital than did males. Data from a 1940 survey of
clerical workers indicate approximately equal returns to time spent with the current
firm.
In the early history of the modern office various tasks were paid by
1-he piece. Typewriters in the Graton and Knight Manufacturing Company, for
example, were equipped with cyciometers, "240 depressions of the typewriter20
keys or space bar [was] equivalent 1-o one point ... 600points [were] considered
base production and each point produced in excess [was] al lowed for at the
rate of one and one—half cents a point" (Coyle 1928, pp. 23—24). The use of
these cyclometers increased the cost of labor, and other cost—saving methods
were examined. Piece rates did not prevail, and their decline was a tribute to
1-he ability of employers to pre—test employees whose training in commercial and
high school courses was completed before job entry.9
Monitoring in the office became simpler and cheaper than in the factory,
despite the general expectation in the 1920s that the office would develop
along factory lines. Employers divided workers into homogeneous groups and
paid each a set day rate. Standardization enabled employers to screen workers
prior -l-o employment. Commonwealth Edison Company, for example, claimed that
its stenographers, typists, and dictaphone operators were "classed by temperament
and ability. A dictator when he needs a girl telephones to the central bureau
and one is sent who is adapted to his kind of work" (Coyle 1928, p. 23).
At the same time, however, managers were aware that the benefits of easily
supervised tasks cost them the ability to screen workers for higher level
positions and cost them the accumulated human capital necessary to produce
such workers. "The modern clerk knows one operation ... Heis, therefore,
less prepared for larger responsibi il-y ... Thestenographer from a central ized
bureau has no ... continuousand responsible relationship to any one person"
(Coyle 1928, p. 27).
Data from the original surveys of a 1940 BureauBulletin of male
and female clerical workers are used 1-0 analyze the returns to training and
Various studies published in the 1920s, utilizing Taylor's scientific
methods, indicated in which clerical jobs managers could effectively screen workers
prior to employment and in which they could not. See the discussion in Davies
(1982), Chapter 6.21
education in the context of the earnings func-tion.1° The findings in Table
3 indIcate that the earnings function for females is similar to that thought
typical today (Mincer and Polachek 1974). Earnings rise gradually with experience
without peaking in the relevant range, education measured in years increases
earnings, and "home time" decreases earnings by about 1.5 percent per year.
The comparisons with the male earnings function reveal that returns to total
experience in clerical work were far greater for men, while returns to experience
with the present firm were lower. Years of education were less valuable for
men, although an advanced or special degree was worth more. That is, men
accumulated relatively more general human capital on the job than did women,
and women accumulated a relatively larger amount of specific human capital.
Consider a man and a woman with five continuous years with their first employer,
thus only five years of experience. The woman's earnings would increase by
13.4 percent because of an Increase in general skIlls and she would receive an
additional 6.6 percent because of skills specific 1-o her current firm. The man
would receive a 24.5 percent increase because of augmented general skills, but
a 5.8 percent increase because of skills specific to his current firm.
Analyses of the occupations of clerical workers in 1940 and at the time
of their first clerical job reinforce the findings on earnings. Men typically
began as clerks and rose through the ranks with experience.If they had college
degrees, they began and remained in ski Iledpositions. Women, however, were
initially placed in jobs by years of education, far more so than were males,
10 These datawere retrieved from the National Archives. For a discussIon
of the Women's Bureau Bulletin and the survey from which these data were obtained,
see Goldin (1984).
Note that these results are the most generous to the alternative
hypothesis. Those using the regressions that exclude the schooling dummies
indicate a barely significant and smaller coefficient on the tenure variable
for men.TAE 3
Earnings FunctionsforFemale and Male Clerical Workers, 1940
Dependent Variable: Log Full-time Salary
Females Males
Constant 6.078* 6.085* 6.474* 6.518*
(0.069) (0.083) (0.095) (0.085)
Totexp 0.0290* 0.0290* 0.0518* 0.0535*
(0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0041)
Totexp2 _0.000453* _0.000447* _0.000848* _0.000889*
(0.000078) (0.000078) (0.000083) (0.000081)
ExpFirm 0.0135* 0.0133* 0.0081** 0.0115*
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0042) (0.0027)
Contin. 0.142* 0.139* -0.0576 -0.0781
(0.030) (0.030) (0.0615) (0.0599)
Furlough _0.0224* ....0.0234* _0.0413* -0.0471 *
(0.0097) (0.0098) (0.0189) (0.0186)
Married 0.0131 0.0149 0.131* 0.119*
(0.0213) (0.0214) (0.030) (0.030)
YrsEduc 0.0380* 0.0371* 0.0260* 0.0171*











R2 0.464 0.468 0.643 0.665
Number
ofObs. 724 724 481 481Sources: See Goldin (1984). These data are a sample of original schedules from
WomersBureau Bulletin No. 188—5, "Office Work in Philadelphia, 1940," (1942),
housed in the National Archives, Record Group #86, Boxes 472—486.
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; *indicatessignificant at least at
1-he 0.05 level; **indicatessignificant at least at the 0.10 level.
Variable Definitions:
Totexp Years since individual began first clerical job
Expfirm Years since individual began work with current employer
Contin. =1if years workers with current employer has been
continuous.
Furlough Number (or percent) of years individual had been furloughed
Married 1 if married
CCDum =1if has a commercial course degree
VocGrad =1if graduated from a vocational school
Cot IDum =1if graduated from college
HSDum =1if graduated from high school
Homelime Number of years unaccounted for, presumably spent out of the
labor force; variable is defined as : Totexp —Expfirm—
yearsspent at other clerical jobs.22
and generally remained In their first positions or ones very similar, independent
of experience. For example, 70 percent of all females who began as stenographers
and dictaphone operators remained so to 1940; 57 percent who began as machine
operators also stayed in that position. Both findings areinvariant to years
of office experience. One important exception to the absence of jobadvancement
is secretaries, who frequently rose through the ranks beginning first as general
office clerks. Among males, the situation seems much 1-he reverse. Fully
one—third of all the men In 1940 were classed in skilled positions (only 6
percent of the females were). One—third of these began in skilled positions,
typically those with college educations men, but another 40 percent rose through
the ranks beginning as general office clerks.
Thus It appears 1-hat women began to be employed in the clerical sector
when its jobs could be more finely divided and its output more cheaply monitored.
The presence of machinery and more task oriented jobs did not eliminate the
accumulation of specific human capital among clerical workers, female or male,
but did allow for a finer division of labor.
4. Concluding Remarks
The literature on occupational segregation by sex has focused on differences
in 1-hetypesof jobs held by males and females, particularly on 1-hose in different
sectors of the economy and with emphasis on the degree and nature of the human
capital required. But within various Industries and even withincertain
occupations, male and female jobs have differed by the methodof payment and
the nature of the supervisory and monitoring input necessary to elicit output.
The model that was offered in Section 2 explored the implications of various
types of supervisory and monitoring methods, for which expectedtime on the
job was an important determinant. These Implications were exploredwith data
from 1890 to 1940 regarding manufacturing and clericalwork.23
During this period the majority of female workers did have rather abbreviated
labor force experiences. The labor force participation rate for white married
women was low for all age groups until the 1950s. Most women entered the labor
force sometime before they married but at the time of marriage exited the labor
force permanently. Thus it appears that the assumption of the model concerning
the relative length of stay with firms for the majority of males and females was
reasonable.
Because so many women exited from the labor force a-i- the time of marriage
in the 1920s and 1930s various firms instituted prohibitions against their female
employees marrying and had stated policies against hiring married women. One
interpretation of such prohibitions is that they served a screening function.
Firms wanted to attract women who would remain in the labor force for some
period of time, and these prohibitions led to the self—selection of those who
planned on marrying late or not at all. These prohibitions emerged at the time
the clerical sector was expanding and were used to a great extent in the insurance
and banking segments of this industry, a finding consistent with the notion
that there were large fixed hiring costs in 1-his sector.
But sometime after 1950 an expanding portion of the female population
had rather continuous and lengthy stays in the labor force even after marriage
(Goldin 1983; Smith and Ward 1984). The female labor force began to be populated
by a more heterogeneous group with regard to life—cycle labor force participation,
and an extension of the work of this paper would involve exploring the screening
or reveal ing mechanisms 1-hal- have been used to ascertain this aspect of employment
where there are hiring costs, shirking, or specific human capital paid, in
part, by the employer.REFERENCES
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